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FILED
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA

OCT 07 2004

GARY M. BLAIR, Executive Officer
BY Carrie L. Wagner
CARRIE L. WAGNER, Deputy Clerk

8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9 FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA
10 SANTA MARIA DIVISION

11
12 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

13 Plaintiff,

14 v.

15
16 MICHAEL JOE JACKSON,

17 Defendant.

No. 1133603

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Unsealed pursuant to 6/16/05 court order
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
OBTAINED BY SEARCH
WARRANT NO. 5135

DATE: October 14, 2004
TIME: 8:30 a.m.
DEPT: SM 2 (Melville)

~~FILED UNDER SEAL~~

20 A. Introduction

21 Defendant moves to suppress evidence seized from the residence of Evelyn Tavasci
22 on September 15, 2004 in obedience to a search warrant (SW 5135) on the following grounds:

23 -- "(1) ... the search amounted to an overbroad, general search ... ;

24 -- "(2) the District Attorney invaded the defense camp in violation of Mr. Jackson's
25 rights to counsel, due process, a fair trial and right against self-incrimination guaranteed by the
26 [federal and state Constitutions];

27 -- "(3) the property to be seized, listed in the search warrant, could have been obtained
28 by a subpoena that would have targeted the pertinent information and avoided abuse of Mr.

1 Jackson's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution;

2 – "(4) the prosecution should have obtained the materials sought by the search warrant
3 through the pretrial discovery process;" and

4 – "(5) the seized items are protected by the attorney-client privilege."

5 Those grounds will be addressed here, more or less in that order.

6 B. Discussion

7 I

8 DEFENDANT HAS NO STANDING TO COMPLAIN
9 ABOUT THE ALLEGED "OVERBREADTH" OF THE
10 SEARCH OF PREMISES NOT HIS OWN. IN ANY
11 EVENT, THE SEARCH WAS NOT OVERBROAD

12 A. Defendant's "Standing" To Complain About The
13 Search Of Ms. Taveschi's Residence

14 1. The Residence As "Residence"

15 Under the heading, "Mr. Jackson Has A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy In The
16 Office Of His Personal Assistant," Defendant argues: "The Fourth Amendment protects people
17 not places. (*Katz v. United States* (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 351.)

18 Defendant's reliance on *Katz's* famous catchphrase is misplaced. In his oft-quoted
19 concurring opinion in that case, Justice Harlan said that "the question . . . is what protection the
20 Fourth Amendment affords to those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question
21 requires reference to a 'place.' My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior
22 decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first, that a person have exhibited an actual
23 (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
24 prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" (389 U.S. 347, at 361 (Harlan, J., conc.))

25 The high court's decisions since *Katz* embrace that formulation. See, e.g., *Terry v.*
26 *Ohio* (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 9 [88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889] ("We have recently held that 'the
27 Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.' *Katz v. United States*, 389 U.S. 347, 351
28 (1967), and wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy,' *id.*, at p.
361 (MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring), he is entitled to be free from unreasonable

governmental intrusion"). Quite uniformly, decisional law before and since *Katz* holds that a defendant does not have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" in someone else's home. (See, e.g., *People v. Ortiz* (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 1, 5 [for purposes of knock-notice, "a trespasser — or a burglar — cannot make another man's home his castle . . ."]; *United States v. Armenta* (9th Cir. 1995) 69 F.3d 304, 308-309 [without sufficient credible evidence he was an overnight guest in his friend's home, Armenta had no standing to challenge search of it]; *People v. Cowan* (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 795, 707-798 [defendant's status as an occasional visitor to residence did not afford him standing to contest search of premises that disclosed methamphetamine between cushions of couch on which he was sitting]; *People v. Canada* (1987) 19 Cal.App.3d 402, 420-421 [search of defendant's former residence did not violate his present expectation of privacy].)

Ms. Tavasci's home is not Mr. Jackson's castle. He has no standing to complain about the search of that place.

"The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged search or seizure." (*Rakas v. Illinois* (1978) 439 U.S. 128, 131, fn. 1 [58 L.Ed.2d 387, 393, 99 S.Ct. 1035]; see *People v. Ooley* (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 197, 202.)

2. The Residence As "Office"

Defendant alleges, "Evelyn Tavasci is the personal assistant for Michael Jackson and the executive administrator of MJJ Productions. She administers the business and personal affairs for Mr. Jackson out of the office at her residence." (Motion 4:6-11.) And Ms. Tavasci declares that the detached garage at her residence "is built out and houses office equipment and supplies" which "was paid for and belongs to MJJ Productions." (Tavasci Decl., ¶¶ 3, 4.)

Considering the Tavasci garage as a place of business doesn't significantly improve Defendant's standing to complain about the search of it. It is, at most, the office of MJJ Productions, Inc., a legal "person" and entity in its own right.¹ The Fourth Amendment

¹ MJJ Productions, Inc. is an active California corporation (No. C0944110), whose articles of incorporation were filed October 30, 1979 and whose agent for service of process is Zia Modabber, a

1 extends to business premises as well as residential premises, of course. (See, e.g., *Michigan v.*
2 *Tyler* (1978) 436 U.S. 499, 504-505 [98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486].) But so far as is known,
3 Defendant himself did not conduct business from those premises or maintain workspace of his
4 own in the office-garage. It does not appear, then, that he has standing to complain about the
5 search of MJJ Inc.'s/Tavasci's office space. (See, e.g., *United States v. Britt* (5th Cir. 1975)
6 508 F.2d 1052, 1054-1055 [corporate president had no standing with respect to seizure of
7 corporate records from a storage area where he never spent any of his time working]; *United*
8 *States v. Taketa* (9th Cir. 1991) 923 F.2d 665, 675-678 [agent in charge of DEA office lacked
9 standing regarding office of fellow agent adjoining his, as "O'Brien's office was given over to
10 O'Brien's exclusive use and contained his personal desk and files"]; *State v. Richards* (Minn.
11 1996) 552 N.W.2d 197, 204 ["A defendant who cannot demonstrate a legitimate expectation
12 of privacy relating to the area searched or the item seized will not have standing to contest the
13 legality of the search or seizure. *Rakas v. Illinois*, 439 U.S. 128, 138-48, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 99
14 S.Ct. 421 (1978)"].)

15 3. The Records Themselves

16 Defendant argues, "Mr. Jackson has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard
17 to materials in control of his personal assistant, particularly with regard to confidential legal
18 documents." (Motion 4:6-11.)

19 Unless Defendant can satisfy the Court that the documents seized are his own
20 personal property, as distinct from records generated by others in the course of the business of
21 MJJ, Inc., his argument is not well taken. (Compare *Henzel v. United States* (5th Cir. 1961)
22 296 F.2d 650, 653 ["appellant was the organizer, sole stockholder and president of Chemoil
23 Corporation. Appellant prepared much of the material seized, and this material was kept in his
24 office along with some of his personal belongings. Although he was temporarily absent from
25 his office when it was searched, appellant spent the greater part of every average working day

26
27 lawyer in Katten Muchin Zavis Rosenman, 2029 Century Park East, Suite 2600, Los Angeles. (This
28 information was obtained from the records of the California Secretary of State, accessed online at
Kepler.ss.ca.gov/corpdam/ShowList)

1 there." Held: he had standing to contest the seizure of the company's records] with *United*
2 *States v. Britt* (5th Cir. 1975) 508 F.2d 1052, 1055 ["Here, although Britt was president of,
3 Fitts, he was not its sole stockholder, the documents seized were normal corporate records not
4 prepared personally by him, and the area searched . . . was described as a 'storage area.'
5 Furthermore, there is not evidence that Britt spent any of his time working in the storage area -
6 or in any other space at 1819 Peachtree for that matter - or that any of the material seized there
7 was taken from his personal desk or briefcase or files." Held: no standing].)

8 Moreover, Defendant's assumed standing to protest the *seizure* of his property (if
9 such property was seized) may not equip him with standing to protest the scope of the *search*
10 that brought it to light. It was Ms. Tavasci's home-office and her computers (or the computers
11 of MJJ Productions, Inc.) that were searched, not Mr. Jackson's. Defendant has no possessory
12 interest in either.

13 "When a defendant only has standing to object to the seizure, then 'the case is the
14 same as though the [goods] had been found in plain view in a public place and then seized,'
15 that is, the defendant may only contend that the police lacked grounds to believe that the items
16 were connected with criminal activity or some other lawful basis for seizure." (5 LaFare,
17 *Search and Seizure* (3d ed. 1996), Standing, § 11.3(d), p. 161 (fn. omitted), citing and quoting
18 *United States v. Lisk* (7th Cir. 1975) 522 F.2d 228, 230.)

19 If an accused elected to leave his property in the care of an acquaintance in whose
20 residence he himself had no reasonable expectation of privacy, that accused may not seek to
21 suppress such property as evidence against him on the ground that the search which disclosed
22 it was unlawful. See, e.g., *People v. McPeters* (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148 [murder weapon
23 belonging to defendant, located under his cousin's pillow in her own room]:

24 "An illegal search or seizure violates the federal constitutional rights
25 only of those who have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
26 invaded place or seized thing. (*United States v. Salvucci* (1980) 448
27 U.S. 83, 91-92 [65 L.Ed.2d 619, 628, 100 S.Ct. 2547].) The
28 legitimate expectation of privacy must exist in the *particular area*
searched or thing seized in order to bring a Fourth Amendment

challenge.” (*People v. Hernandez* (1998) 199 Cal.App.3d 1182,
1189, italics in original.)

(*McPeters, supra*, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1171.)

B. Assuming “Standing,” The Search Was Not Overbroad

So far as is relevant here, the warrant authorized the seizure of

– “1. Any written, typed or printed documentation, which tends to show the activities
and/or whereabouts of Michael JACKSON and/or his close associates during February and
March 2003,” and

– “2. Computers and computer media including computer including central processing
units (CPUs), hard disk drives, floppy disk drives, tape drives, removable media drives,
optical/CD-ROM drives, servers, workstations, display screens, input devices (including but
not limited to keyboards, mice, and trackballs), printers, modems, peripherals, floppy disks,
magnetic tapes, cassette tapes, removable storage media, and/or optical/CD-ROM disks or
cartridges, found together or separately from one another.”

The documents seized in the course of the warranted search either “tended to show
the activities or whereabouts of Michael Jackson during February and March, 2003” or the
folders in which they were maintained suggested the contents would be relevant, or the
document appeared to have other relevance to the ongoing investigation when they came into
the plain view of the searching officer. The Court has possession of the documents seized in
that search and can make its own determination of their relevance to the prosecution.

IV

THE SEARCH OF THE HOME-OFFICE OF DEFENDANT’S
PERSONAL ASSISTANT DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN
“INVASION OF THE DEFENSE CAMP”

A claimed “invasion of the defense camp” was the theme of some of defendant’s
earlier motions to suppress evidence. Now, as before, he cites *Barber v. Municipal Court*
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 742 as authority for his argument that anyone associated with defendant who

1 might be in possession of evidence of interest to law enforcement is a member of the "defense
2 camp," and a warranted search of the premises occupied by that person is an "invasion of the
3 defense camp."

4 *Barber* involved the intrusion of undercover law enforcement officers into
5 confidential attorney-client conferences arising out of the arrest of "sit-in" protesters at the
6 Diablo Canyon nuclear facility in San Luis Obispo County by posing as fellow protesters.
7 The execution of a search warrant on premises maintained by someone closely involved with
8 defendant's activities and knowledgeable about his comings and goings over the years, and
9 who is likely to be in possession of relevant evidence, was no more an "invasion of the defense
10 camp" than was the search of Defendant's own residence. Ms. Tavasci is not immune from
11 search merely because she regards herself as an essential link between Defendant and his many
12 lawyers.

13
14 A SUBPOENA WOULD NOT BE AN APPROPRIATE
15 MEANS OF OBTAINING THE EVIDENCE SOUGHT
16 BY THE SEARCH WARRANT. FOR SOME OF THE
17 VERY REASONS DISCUSSED BY DEFENDANT

18 Defendant complains that the investigators should have sought the information they
19 desired "through the use of a subpoena, rather than a search warrant." (Motion 8:3-5) With
20 nice inconsistency, Defendant then argues that "Neither a search warrant nor a subpoena are
21 the appropriate vehicle for obtaining the types of documents sought by the search warrant. The
22 District Attorney was obligated to seek these materials through California's reciprocal
23 discovery process." (*Id.*, 9:5-8.)

24 Defendant notes, "A search warrant does not afford Mr. Jackson the status of a
25 litigant and does not afford him . . . his right to counsel. A search warrant is an intrusive
26 technique, used to identify crime." (Motion 8:3-7.)

27 Execution of a search warrant is, almost by definition, "intrusive." The function of
28 a search warrant is to allow investigators to secure evidence believed necessary to further a
criminal investigation, and to secure that evidence without the prior notice that might prompt

1 its custodian to conceal it. A search warrant's scope is broader than a subpoena. A warrant is
2 not a pleading in a lawsuit. Even so, the person affected by the resulting search, and counsel of
3 his or her choice, may "litigate" the sufficiency of the underlying warrant and the propriety of
4 its execution. (This Opposition responds to the third effort by Defendant to suppress evidence
5 obtained on the authority of a warrant issued by the Court.)

6 There was, evidently, "reason . . . to search the office of Mr. Jackson's personal
7 assistant" for evidence of Defendant's "whereabouts and activities during February and March
8 of 2003." If there were not, a motion to suppress on that ground would have been made.
9 Beyond a throwaway sentence in the pending motion to that effect (Motion 8:9-10), no such
10 ground has been raised, let alone discussed. Defendant's argument is simply rhetorical.

11 VI

12 THE MATERIAL OBTAINED ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE
13 SEARCH WARRANT COULD NOT HAVE BEEN OBTAINED
14 THROUGH DISCOVERY

15 As noted, Defendant argues "the District Attorney was obligated to seek these
16 materials through California's reciprocal discovery process." (*Id.*, 9:6-8.)

17 The People have been conspicuously unsuccessful in obtaining much of anything
18 from the defense by way of discovery. Be that as it may, the information sought by Search
19 Warrant No. 5135 would not appear to come within the provisions of Penal Code section
20 1054.3. To the extent some of it might constitute "relevant written or recorded statements of"
21 persons the defense "intends to call as witnesses at trial," defense counsel surely would claim
22 that the defense has not yet formed a clear intention to call anyone as a witness in the
23 upcoming trial. In Dr. Johnson's famous phrase, "Depend upon it, Sir . . ."

24 All of which is academic in light of Penal Code section 1054.4, which provides,
25 "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as limiting any law enforcement or prosecuting
26 agency from obtaining nontestimonial evidence to the extent permitted by law on the effective
27 date of this section" (i.e., June 5, 1990). Whatever else may be encompassed by that statute, it
28 surely answers Defendant's argument that once charges are filed, the prosecution is limited by

1 the discovery statutes in its efforts to obtain further evidence.

2
3 VII

4 THE COURT WILL DETERMINE WHETHER GIVEN
5 ITEMS OF EVIDENCE "ARE PROTECTED BY THE
6 ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE.

7 Certain of the property seized in obedience to Search Warrant No. 5135 was sealed
8 and submitted to the Court for its determination whether some or all of it is protected by the
9 attorney-client privilege. By definition, any documents that are found to come within the
10 privilege are privileged from disclosure to the prosecution.

11 Defendant lists 15 items of seized property he asserts "are subject to the protection
12 of the attorney-client privilege." (Motion 9:4 - 10:8.)

13 Defendant makes no effort to articulate what he believes is the scope of the
14 attorney-client privilege. Given that most if not all of the seized documents appear to be
15 business records rather than confidential communications between lawyer and client, it is plain
16 that the scope of the privilege is not as broad as Defendant supposes.

17 "The question of whether an attorney-client relationship exists is one of law.
18 [Citations.] However, when the evidence is conflicting, the factual basis for the determination
19 must be determined before the legal question is addressed." (*Responsible Citizens v. Superior*
20 *Court* (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1717, 1733.)

21 With exceptions not relevant here, "the client, whether or not a party, has a
22 privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential
23 communication between client and lawyer" if the privilege is claimed by the client, the lawyer
24 or someone else authorized by either of them to claim the privilege." (Evid. Code, § 954.)

25 "As used in this article, 'confidential communication between client and lawyer'
26 means information transmitted between a client and his or her lawyer in the course of that
27 relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the
28 information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the
client in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the

1 transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer is
2 consulted, and includes a legal opinion formed and the advice given by the lawyer in the course
3 of that relationship.” (Evid. Code, § 952.)

4 “The attorney-client privilege and the work product protection doctrine are both
5 statutory creations. (§ 1054.6; Code Civ. Proc., § 2018; Evid. Code, § 954.)” (*People ex rel.*
6 *Lockyer v. Superior Court* (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 387, 397; overruled on other grounds by
7 *People v. Superior Court (Laff)* (2001) 25 Cal.4th 703, 718, n. 5.)

8 The purpose of the privilege is to encourage a client to make a full
9 disclosure to his attorney without fear that others may be informed
10 (*Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court* [(1961)] 56 Cal.2d 355, 396; *Holm*
11 *v. Superior Court* [(1954)] 42 Cal.2d 500; *City & County of San*
12 *Francisco v. Superior Court* [(1951)] 37 Cal.2d 227), and the
13 communication is nevertheless privileged although given by an agent of
14 the client for transmission to the attorney (*San Francisco Unified Sch.*
15 *Dist. v. Superior Court* [(1951)] 55 Cal.2d 451). But the privilege is to
16 be strictly construed in the interest of bringing to light relevant facts.
17 (*Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, supra*, 56 Cal.2d 355, 396.)
While the privilege fully covers communications as such, it does not
extend to subject matter otherwise unprivileged merely because that
subject matter has been communicated to the attorney.

18 (*People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Donovan* (1962) 57 Cal.2d 346, 355, internal
19 quotation marks omitted.) (See also *Martin v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.* (1997) 59
20 Cal.App.4th 333, 342.)

21 Included within the privilege are reports “created as a means of communicating
22 confidential information to the attorney.” (*Jessup v. Superior Court* (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d
23 102, 108.) And a lawyer or client may include in a confidential communication publications
24 that also are available to the public. (*In re Jordan* (1974) 12 Cal.3d 575, 580 [law review
25 article or newspaper clipping of potential use to inmate-client].) But “a litigant cannot silence
26 a witness by having him reveal his knowledge to the litigant’s attorney. We hold that the
27 forwarding to counsel of nonprivileged records, in the guise of reports, will not create a
28 privilege with respect to such records and their contents where none existed before.

1 [Citations.]]” (*San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court* (1961) 55 Cal.2d 451, 457
2 [internal quotation marks omitted].)

3 Motion picture film taken of a plaintiff suing for injuries, by defense counsel’s
4 investigator, is not within the privilege. (*Suezaki v. Superior Court* (1962) 58 Cal.2d 166, 176
5 [“It is quite clear that although the investigator, the attorney and his client may have intended
6 the films to be confidential, to be privileged they must constitute a ‘communication made by
7 the client to [the attorney]’ as that phrase is used in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1881.
8 The film here involved obviously was not such a ‘communication.’ It is simply a physical
9 object transmitted to the attorney either with or without an accompanying report or letter of
10 transmittal. As already pointed out, transmission alone, even where the parties intend the
11 matter to be confidential, cannot create the privilege if none, in fact, exists”].)

12 The statutory privilege does not extend to communications to a lawyer by other than
13 his client (excepting third-party conduits of communications between lawyer and client), even
14 though those communications may convey facts relevant to the client’s case that were obtained
15 from sources other than the client himself, and even though they may come from an employee
16 of the client. (*Green & Shinee v. Superior Court* (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 532, 536-537 [“The
17 privilege covers all forms of communication, including transmittal of documents. (*Wellpoint
18 Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court* [(1997)] 59 Cal.App.4th 110, 119.) Nevertheless, the
19 privilege does not cover every document turned over to an attorney by the client. ‘Documents
20 prepared independently by a party, including witness statements, do not become privileged
21 communications or work product merely because they are turned over to counsel.’ (*Ibid.*) The
22 person claiming the attorney-client privilege must establish that the evidence sought to be
23 protected falls within the statutory terms. (*People ex rel. Lockyer v. Superior Court* (2000) 83
24 Cal.App.4th 387, 397-398.)”])

25 A confidential conversation with a lawyer who is not the attorney for the person
26 making the communication is not within the attorney-client privilege. (*Sharon v. Sharon*
27 (1889) 79 Cal. 633, 678 [“[I]t must appear that the witness learned the matter in question only
28 as counsel, or attorney, or solicitor for the party, and not in any other way Nor does

1 the rule apply to conversations had between the attorney and a third party, or between the third
2 parties in the presence of the attorney and client. [Citations]"[.]

3 The attorney-client privilege does not apply to the client's instructions to his
4 counsel or to the authority given by client to his lawyer to act on his behalf. (*People v. Tucker*
5 (1964) 61 Cal.2d 828, 831.)

6 CONCLUSION

7 Defendant's motion to suppress evidence should be denied. He has no "standing"
8 to complain about the search of Ms. Taveschi's residence or her garage equipped as an office by
9 her corporate employer. Even assuming Defendant's "standing" to prosecute this motion, the
10 search he complains about was not overbroad. It was not an "invasion of the defense camp."
11 The search was undertaken to secure evidence that could not readily be obtained by subpoena
12 or pursuant to the discovery statutes. So far as is known, none of the documents seized in the
13 search constitute confidential communications between Defendant and his team of lawyers,
14 past and present.

15 DATED: October 7, 2004

16 Respectfully submitted,

17 THOMAS W. SNEDDON, JR.
18 District Attorney

19 By: 
20 Gerald McC. Franklin, Senior Deputy

1
2
3 **PROOF OF SERVICE**

4 STATE OF CALIFORNIA

5 COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA


6 } SS

7 I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the County aforesaid; I am over
8 the age of eighteen years and I am not a party to the within-entitled action. My business
9 address is: District Attorney's Office; Courthouse; 1105 Santa Barbara Street, Santa Barbara,
10 California 93101.

11 On October 7, 2004, I served the within PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO
12 DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY SEARCH
13 WARRANT NO. 5135 on Defendant, by THOMAS A. MESEREAU, JR., STEVE
14 COCHRAN, ROBERT SANGER, and BRIAN OXMAN by personally delivering a true copy
15 thereof to Mr. Sanger's office in Santa Barbara, by transmitting a facsimile copy thereof to
16 Attorneys Mesereau and Cochran, and by causing a true copy thereof to be mailed to each of
17 them (Mr. Sanger excepted), first class postage prepaid, at the addresses shown on the attached
18 Service List.

19 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

20 Executed at Santa Barbara, California on this 7th day of October, 2004.

21 

22 Gerald McC. Franklin

SERVICE LIST

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