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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

MAR 0 3 2005

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By CANAL & Wagner
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## SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA SANTA MARIA DIVISION

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff,

Plaintiff,

Plaintiff,

Plaintiff,

Plaintiff,

Plaintiff,

Plaintiff,

Plaintiff,

OUASH SUBPOENAS D.T. TO

HOLTHOUSE, CARLIN & VAN

TRIGHT AND TO BERNSTEIN,

FOX, WHITMAN & CO.

MICHAEL JOE JACKSON,

Defendant.

Defendant.

Defendant.

Defendant.

The People issued subpoenas duces tecum to Holthouse, Carlin & Van Tright, LLP, and to Bernstein, Fox, Whitman & Co., accountants, seeking certain records of defendant's income, expenditures and financial status during 2004.

Defendant moves to quash each subpocna on the ground that "1. [It] fails to establish good cause for production of the subpocnaed documents"; "2. [It] constitutes an invasion of Mr. Jackson's right of privacy pursuant to the [United] States Constitution and Article 1, Section one of the California Constitution"; "3. [It] seeks information that can only be lawfully obtained through the statutory discovery process outlined in Penal Code section 1054 et seq."

OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO QUASH CERTAIN SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM

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and "4. The subpoena is overbroad and seeks information that would compromise trade secrets, would interfere with contracts and would interfere with prospective advantage."

## Response:

1. The Supboena Reflects Good Cause For Production Of The Suppoenaed Documents

Defendant notes that the subpoenas in question were issued "to obtain documents to prove motive on behalf of defendant for the charge offenses and to corroborate the victims of the charged offenses." Defendant arguess that "The court ruled, on January 28, 2005, that the District Attorney cannot use detailed financial evidence to show motive. (Declaration of Robert M. Sanger. The law is very clear in that regard. Therefore there is not good cause to subpoena these materials." (Motion 6:7-21.)

As relates to "financial evidence," our copy of the Court's omnibus "Criminal Minute Order" dated January 28, 2005 reflects only the following:

Attorneys Auchincloss and Sanger addressed the Court re: Plaintiff's Motion in Limine for Admission of Expert Testimony on Defendant's Finances and Application for Order that the Defense Response to the District Attorney's Motion in Limine for Admission of Expert Testimony on Defendant's Finances, Dated January 21, 2005 be Withdrawn. The Court finds that general testimony as it relates to this particular situation may be admissible, but the Court shall reserve ruling at this time. The Court further orders that a 402 hearing shall be held if such witnesses are called."

(Emphasis added.)

2. The Subpoenas Do Not Threaten Defendant's Privacy Under The United States Constitution Or The California Constitution

Defendant argues that the subpoenas seek information protected by "his right of privacy pursuant to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 1, of the California Constitution." (Motion 7:21-22.)

Defendant has cited no authority for that argument. The contrary appears to be the

case.

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Presumably, defendant's reference to his right of privacy under the United States Constitution is to the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.

In opposition to a much earlier effort by defendant to traverse search warrants for bank and credit records, plaintiff noted that

Prior to enactment of Proposition 8 in 1983, a California defendant could assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records, just as in telephone records, and enforce that expectation as a right under California's Constitution. Post-Proposition 8, our courts are governed by the binding authority of the United States Supreme Court in matters touching on the Fourth Amendment.

With respect to bank records (and, by extension, credit-card transaction records), an individual was held not to have reasonable expectation of privacy in them in *United States v. Miller* (1976) 425 U.S. 435 [96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71]. *Miller* held that business records held by a bank are the bank's records, not its customers' records. In *People v. Meyer* (1985) 183 Cal.App.3d 1150, 1163, the Court of Appeal noted, "The [*Miller*] court reasoned that the bank customer has no legitimate expectation of privacy in those records since they are not confidential communications but negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business. The court concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him by government authorities."

Plaintiff's research has not uncovered a decision discussing records of a defendant's own use of his legitimately-obtained credit card, but it is unlikely a different rule would apply to them.

In his opening statement, lead defense counsel told the jury that evidence would "prove" that defendant's relationship with various individuals alleged to be his co-conspirators would reveal that defendant was duped and taken advantage of by some or all of them, and that he had no sufficient knowledge of what they were doing in his name and upon his ostensible authority as to warrant a belief that he, too, was a conspirator.

The evidence of defendant's

The evidence of defendant's "varied and complex business relationships with numerous individuals and entities" (Motion 8:1-2) may show that, to the contrary, defendant was intimately involved in his dealings with them. It will certainly tend to disclose the state of his finances at the time "Living with Michael Jackson" aired in the United States, and to support the testimony of witnesses who have testified or stated that the effect of that broadcast would have an important impact on his future financial well-being.

3. Plaintiff Is Not Limited By The Discovery Provisions
Of The Penal Code In Its Effort To Obtain Records
In The Possession Of Third Parties

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's subpoenas are discovery tools, and that the provisions of Penal Code section 1054 ct seq, limit the means of obtaining discovery in a criminal case so as to exclude the use of a subpoena duces tecum for records in the possession of a third party. "The express terms of the statutes state that the prosecutor cannot use the subpoena process to obtain discovery." (Motion 8:18-19.)

The "express terms of the statutes" say no such thing. Defendant may chose to infer that section 1054, subdivision (e)'s provision that "no discovery shall occur in criminal cases except as provided by this chapter, other express statutory provisions, or as mandated by the Constitution of the United States" may be so construed. But decisional law contradicts that assumption. (See *People v. Superior Court (Barrett)* (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1314 ["The statutory scheme does not apply to discovery from third parties"; defendant's use of subpoena duces tecum upheld]; *Teal v. Superior Court (People)* (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 488, 491 [same, citing *Barrett)*].)

4. To The Extent The Subpoenaed Documents May
Reveal "Trade Secrets," Defendant Will Be
Adequately Protected By The Court's Review
Of Evidence The People May Seek To Admit
Concerning The State Of Defendant's Finances

It seems unlikely that evidence in the possession of defendant's accountants and

business managers (including contracts) constitute "trade secrets," but assuming some of those documents would come within the Civil Code section 3426.1, subdivision (d)'s definition of "trade secret," there will be time enough for defendant to seck an appropriate protective order concerning the prosecutor's use of such documents. Defendant will, of course, be made aware of all documents obtained in obedience to the subpoenas duces tecum.

DATED: March 2, 2005

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS W. SNEDDON, JR. District Attorney

By:

Gerald McC. Franklin, Senior Deputy District Attorney

Attorneys for Plaintiff

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OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO QUASH CERTAIN SUBPOENAS DUCES TECUM

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## PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA

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I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the County aforesaid; I am over the age of eighteen years and I am not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is: District Attorney's Office; Courthouse; 1112 Santa Barbara Street, Santa Barbara, California 93101.

On March 2, 2005, I served the within PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENAS D.T. TO HOLTHOUSE, CARLIN & VAN TRIGT AND TO BERNSTEIN, FOX, WHITMAN & CO." on Defendant, by THOMAS A. MESEREAU, JR., ROBERT SANGER, and BRIAN OXMAN by personally delivering a true copy thereof to Mr. Sanger's office in Santa Barbara, and by transmitting a facsimile copy thereof to Attorney Mesereau at his confidential fax number in Santa Maria at the addresses shown on the attached Service List.

On the same date, I served Nasatir, Hirsch, Podberesky & Genego, Lawyers, and Michael Nasatir, Esq., counsel for Bernstein, Fox, Whitman & Co. and Holtman, Carlin & Van Tright, LLP, by transmitting a true copy thereof to Mr. Nasatir at the fax number shown on the Service List.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Santa Barbara, California on this 2nd day of April, 2005.

Gerald McC. Franklin