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13 14	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
15	FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA, COOK DIVISION	
16 17	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF) CALIFORNIA,)	Case No. 1133603
18 19	Plaintiffs,) vs.	MR. JACKSON'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE REFERENCE TO CIVIL AND ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTS
20 21	MICHAEL JOSEPH JACKSON,	Honorable Rodney S. Melville
22	Defendant.	Date: January 28, 2005 Timel \$:30 a.m.
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İ	REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE RE: REFERENCE TO CIVIL	

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A. Introduction

Mr. Michael Jackson submits this Reply in support of his Motion in Limine to Preclude Reference to the from civil with third parties. Civil that are remote in time and dictated by considerations which prevent plaintiff from making a claim they constitute an "admission" have no place in this proceeding and are irrelevant.

B. Evidence of Prior Civil Amounts Is Irrelevant and Inflammatory.

Plaintiff claims evidence of civil the purpose, which it has not yet decided to seek leave for admission in evidence, is relevant as an admission against interest. (Plaintiff's Memo, p. 2, lines 10-11). However, a civil the purpose is neither an admission against interest, nor relevant to determine the purpose for which a civil the was made. Any number of reasons compel a civil the purpose, including insurance, third parties, and economic circumstances which have nothing to do with an admission against interest. Further, the purpose itself states it is not an admission of guilt or liability.

Plaintiff states:

"The prosecution obtained its copies of the relevant documents [involving civil lawsuits] from the Internet. The People are not required to make 'discovery' of them to defendant because they do not come within the provisions of Penal code section 1054.1, nor arc they 'Brady' material." (Platiniff's Memo, p. 3, ln 27 to p. 4, ln 3).

However, plaintiff's claim is not the standard for section 1054.1. More important, if plaintiff is claiming the is an "admission" against interest, which is a witness statement, and there is no question that plaintiff needed to disclose the information. Any witness statement must be disclosed, and plaintiff has not disclosed it despite getting it off "the Internet."

Witness statements are always relevant to the proceeding and must be disclosed. Penal Code section 1054.1(f); Thompson v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. App. 4th 480, 488 (1997). Any interview or statements a witness has made, and any writing regarding that statement, should be disclosed to the defendant. Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 423, 424 (1959). The courts have gone to great lengths to assure that statements a person has made in the possession of law enforcement are disclosed to a defendant. Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal: 3d 456, 377; Hubbard v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1163, 11167 (1997).

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE REFERENCE TO CERTAIN AND ADDRESS OF THE PROPERTY OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE REFERENCE TO CERTAIN AND ADDRESS OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROP

C. Evidence of Mind, Criminal Culpability, or Efforts to Conceal Prior Acts.

Plaintiff claims that if a lawsuit alleged (Plaintiff's Memo, p. 3, lines 4-5). However, was a tacit admission that there was merit to the lawsuit." (Plaintiff's Memo, p. 3, lines 4-5). However, not only is the conclusion contrary to fact, but also there is no relevance to the conclusion because the claim a lawsuit has merit is not material to this case. Of a civil proceeding is neither an admission against interest nor an admission the lawsuit has merit because numerous other factors having nothing to do with "admissions" or "merit" are involved in civil (Plaintiff's Memo, p. 3, lines 4-5). However, not only is the conclusion to the claim a lawsuit has merit because numerous other factors having nothing to do with "admissions" or "merit" are involved in civil (Plaintiff's Memo, p. 3, lines 4-5).

Plaintiff cites People v. Muniz, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1508 (1989), for the proposition evidence Code section 1152 does not apply to criminal proceedings. (Plaintiff's Memo, p. 4, lines 20-21). However, Muniz, which was disapproved by the Supreme Court in People v. Escobar, 3 Cal. 4th 740 (1992), 11 provided only that offers to the alleged "victim" are not covered by section 1152. Civil to third parties are neither addressed nor covered by the Muniz decision, and the public policy considerations of permitting statements a defendant makes to an alleged "victim" are not present with regard to third party civil 13 years earlier, nor do such civil constitute "admissions" as did the statements defendant made to the victim in Muniz.

In <u>People v. Muniz</u>, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1508 (1989), defendant was charged with forced and with a sharp object. The prosecution sought to introduce testimony that defendant offered to pay for some of the alleged victim's medical expenses and made offers to the alleged victim. The court permitted the testimony over defendant's objection the offer in compromise was a that could not be introduce under Evidence Code section 1152(a). Defendant was convicted of forced The Court of appeal affirmed, finding Evidence Code section

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE REFERENCE TO

Plaintiff correctly points out <u>Muniz</u> was disapproved by the Supreme Court in <u>People v. Escobar</u>, 3 Cal. 4th 740 (1992) (Plaintiff's Memo, p. 5, lines 6-10). However, the disapproval goes much further than plaintiff contends because it was the Supreme Court's disapproved the conclusion of the nature of the injuries in <u>Muniz</u>. Those injuries did not constitute great bodily injury, and defendant's offer to pay medical bills was part of that determination. Plaintiff is asking this court to make a decision to admit evidence in this case based on a Court of Appeal decision plaintiff knows was disapproved by the Supreme Court.

1152(a)'s prohibition against admission of to establish liability are not applicable to criminal case if the issue was guilt or innocence for the act to which the offer of compromise was made. Id. at 1515.

Use of such evidence to show "guilt" is not the same as the use of such evidence in a civil case to show "liability." Id. The statement was an admission against interest as to the issue alleged crime being tried, and not as to some other act or past occurrence. Id. Further, the statement defendant wished to pay for medical expenses was not an offer in compromise, but rather an admission against interest. Id. at 1516.

Mr. Jackson has made no offer or suggestion to the current complaining witnesses. The evidence involving regards an 11 and 13-year old "civil" cases where the would be introduce to show civil "liability," not an admission against interest. The proffered evidence fits squarely within the prohibition of section 1152(a) and is not offered to show "guilt" in this case, but rather to show civil "liability" in a prior civil case which is irrelevant.

D. Evidence Deprives Mr. Jackson of Effective Cross-Examination.

Plaintiff claims that Evidence Code section 1154 was intended to prevent the defendant in a civil case from using the fact that a plaintiff offered to this claim for a small amount as evidence that the claim had no real merit if the offer was spurned and the matter went to trial. (Plaintiff's Memo, p. 5, ln 26, to p. 6, ln 1). However, section 1154 covers much more than using evidence against a plaintiff who offered a small amount. The section prohibits any evidence a person has "accepted" a sum of money in of a claim, and that section prohibits Mr. Jackson from cross-examining any witness who has accepted a sum of money in the offered to the claim of the claim of their claim "to prove the invalidity of the claim or any part of it."

Mr. Jackson will not be able to ask witnesses why they accepted what they accepted in their invalid claim. He will not be able to ask them the nature of the terms of the to prove the invalidity of their claim. It is not a question of the prove the "invalidity" of the claim that Evidence Code section 1154 prohibits when it creates a prohibition against questioning any person about a "to prove the invalidity of the claim or any part of it."

The violation of Mr. Jackson's right to a fair trial and due process are patent because he cannot cross-examine the witnesses plaintiff wants to present against him. It is not enough for plaintiff to say that if the court will waive section 1152, it will waive section 1154. The Legislature recognizes that evidence of

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from third parties who are not complaining witnesses in this criminal case are irrelevant to any issue in this case. What plaintiff proposes is a direct violation of Mr. Jackson's rights to a fair trial.

E. No "Admission" Can be Inferred from An 11 or 13-Year Old Third Party Civil

Plaintiff claims the Mr. Jackson subscribed in the lawsuit was subscribed by Mr. Jackson and therefore he made the (Plaintiff's Memo, p. 6, lines 20-21). Apparently, plaintiff is referring to a document it has not produced in discovery in this case. More important, it is not a question of who signed the document, but rather who made and paid the that is at the heart of the "admission" plaintiff wishes to assert.

The admission plaintiff wants to assert is that the payment of a second is an admission against interest, not the sitself. It is the second of the second that this Motion in Limine requests be excluded from evidence, because it is the second of the second that is irrelevant. Plaintiff's claim that Mr. Jackson reached second with civil claimants in the past is irrelevant to this proceeding, and the speculation about the second of those second or the source of payment, whether by third parties or insurance carriers, is improper because plaintiff has produced no evidence in discovery concerning those second or who paid them.

Technology, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 32 Cal. App. 4th 14, 23-28 (1995). Unless the plaintiff is prepared to prove Mr. Jackson paid every dime of these and that no insurance was involved, plaintiff's claim of conscious state, admission, or proof of criminality lacks foundation and is irrelevant. The time for plaintiff to make this showing was for this hearing, and plaintiff has made no showing.

Plaintiff states "But it was defendant's signature on the and and not, not the representative of his insurance carrier." (Plaintiff's Memo, p. 7, lines 13-14). However, insurance carriers rarely if ever sign involving their insured because their only interest is to get a release from the claimant, and the issue here is not who signed the but who made and paid for the

What plaintiff is asking this court to do is engaged in a debate over a made 11-years ago and another made 13-years ago where witnesses have disappeared, memories have faded, and documents do not exist. This 11 and 13-year old debate is not only stale, but also far too remote to have any relevance to this case. The use of a claimed admission from 11 and 13-years ago is not only a violation of the statute of

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE REFERENCE TO

limitations, but also a violation of Mr. Jackson's right to a speedy trial. The prohibition against stale claims is specifically designed to prevent precisely what has happened here from fading memories and disappearance of witnesses.

F. Claims of Violate the Prohibitions in the Statute of Limitations.

1. The are time remote and time barred.

Plaintiff claims:

"Evidence Code section 1108 permits the introduction of evidence of other of the defendant's quite apart from the statute of limitations for the earlier of those offenses."

(Plaintiff's Memo, p. 8, lines 7-8).

However, prior offense evidence does not include prior speculation of who paid the or why it was made. Prior offense evidence under section 1108 was not designed to permit an plaintiff from claiming an admission from a stale third party civil where the of the or who is irrelevant.

Plaintiff cites <u>People v. Branch</u>, 91 Cal. app. 4th 274 (2001), for the proposition that evidence of "committed 30 years earlier is admissible under section 1108. (Plaintiff's Memo, p. 8, lines 9-10)./ However, evidence of "committed" is not evidence of a civil section, nor is it an attempt to create an "admission" where no such admission exists.

In People v. Branch, 91 Cal. App. 4th 274, 281 (2001), the court stated:

"In this regard, section 1108 implicitly abrogates prior decisions ... indicating that 'propensity' evidence is per se unduly prejudicial to the defense. [Citation.]" (People v. Falsetta (1999) 121 Cal.4th 903, 911 (Falsetta).) Our Supreme Court has determined that the admission of evidence regarding a defendant's propensity to commit a sex act under section 1108 does not violate the defendant's right to due process of law. (Falsetta, supra, at pp. 910, 922.)

The existence of a does not establish a "propensity" to commit an offense, nor did the abrogation of "propensity" evidence in section 1108 cover the "propensity" to Mr.

Jackson, just like any other large business, has thousands of civil claims in his lifetime. The

abrogation of "propensity" evidence for sex acts by section 1108 never included civil 2 parties, and such evidence is both irrelevant and outside the scope of section 1108. 3 2. Plaintiff cannot use 13 year old to show criminal intent. 4 should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because Evidence of civil 5 it has no probative value. Such evidence has no logical connection to the claimed "admission" plaintiff 6 7 seeks to assert, and any such connection is far outweighed by the prejudicial effect of such evidence. The 8 evidence is speculative as to the reasons for the speculative as to the reasons for the 9 whether the was voluntary, involuntary, or compelled by irrelevant circumstances that render it 10 far more prejudicial than any probative value. 11 E. Conclusion. 12 13 For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Jackson requests his Motion in Limine to Exclude Reference to 14 be granted. 15 16 DATED: January 26, 2005 Respectfully submitted, 17 Thomas A. Mesereau, Jr. 18 Susan Yu COLLINS, MESEREAU, REDDOCK & YU 19 Robert M. Sanger 20 SANGER & SWYSEN 21 Brian Oxman 22 OXMAN & JAROSCAK 23 24 25 R. Brian Oxman Attorneys for defendant 26 Mr. Michael Jackson 27 28

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