THOMAS W. SNEDDON, JR., DISTRICT ATTORNEY County of Santa Barbara 2 By: RONALD J. ZONEN (State Bar No. 85094) JAN 26 2005 Senior Deputy District Attorney 3 GORDON AUCHINCLOSS (State Bar No. 150251) GARY M. BLAIR, Executive Officer Senior Deputy District Attorney By Carrie & Wagner GERALD McC. FRANKLIN (State Bar No. 40171) 4 Senior Deputy District Attorney 5 1112 Santa Barbara Street Santa Barbara, CA 93101 to leliblos court ordor Telephone: (805) 568-2300 6 FAX: (805) 568-2398 7 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA SANTA MARIA DIVISION 10 11 12 No. 1133603 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 13 Plaintiff. PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO 14 **DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO** 15 PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 16 MICHAEL JOE JACKSON. ADMIT EXPERT Defendant. TESTIMONY ON 17 **DEFENDANT'S FINANCES** 18 DATE: January 28, 2004 19 TIME: 8:30 AM 20 DEPT.: SM2 (Melville) 21 22 A. Introduction 23 Defendant evokes the well established rule that a defendant's poverty generally may 24 not be admitted to prove a motive to commit a crime involving the acquisition of money or 25 other thing of value (citing People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1076 and People v. 26 Carrillo (2004) 119 Cal. App. 4th 94). He argues that, therefore, his own wealth "may not be 27 used to establish a motive because it utilizes a suspect criteria in an unfair discrimination that 28

violates Mr. Jackson's rights to equal protection and to a fair trial to prove a motive where the

The attempted parallel is unpersuasive.

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Carrillo, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th 94, succinctly articulated the rationale of the rule that poverty is, in most cases, not a basis for inferring a motive to steal:

While "lack of money is logically connected with a crime involving financial gain . . . [t]he trouble is that it would prove too much against too many." (State v. Mathis (1966) 47 N.J. 455 [221 A.2d 529, 538] [reversing murder conviction because, inter alia, the prosecutor introduced evidence that "projected before the jury the forbidden theme that defendant had no apparent means of income and hence was likely to commit a crime for dollar gain"].) As the court explained in United States v. Mitchell (9th Cir. 1999) 172 F.3d 1104, "Lack of money gives a person an interest in having more. But so does the desire for money, without poverty. A rich man's greed is as much a motive to steal as a poor man's poverty. Proof of either, without more, is likely to amount to a great deal of unfair prejudice with little probative value." [Id. at pp. 1108-1110 [reversing robbery conviction because the prosecutor introduced evidence of defendant's 'impecunious financial circumstances"].)

At bottom, the issue is one of fairness: "It is fundamental to our conception of a fair trial that equality of treatment must be afforded to all without regard to differences in social status or economic condition. In a society which cherishes the ideal of equal justice for all and seeks to accord the equal protection of the laws to all those who are accused of crime, it would be difficult to accept any other view." (United States ex rel. Mertz v. State of New Jersey (3d Cir. 1970) 423 F.2d 537, 541; see also 2 Wigmore, Evidence, § 392, p. 431 [Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979) [practical result of poverty evidence "would be to put a poor person under so much unfair suspicion and at such a relative disadvantage that for reasons of fairness [such evidence] has seldom been countenanced"].)

(People v. Carrillo, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th 94, at p. 102.)

Carrillo's citation to United States v. Mitchell (9th Cir. 1999) 172 F.3d 1104 is instructive. That court noted, "There is a distinction between an interest, in the sense that it is

 in anyone's interest to be richer rather than poorer, and an inclination. A mere interest, unconnected with inclination, desperation, or other evidence that the person was likely to commit the crime does not add much, in most cases, to the probability that the defendant committed a crime." (*Id.*, at p. 1109.)

If <u>poverty</u> – often an intractable condition imposed by circumstances of birth, education or mental condition beyond the ability of an individual to overcome – ought not to be assigned as a motivating factor for a defendant's theft-related crime on policy grounds, it does not follow that evidence of a motive to preserve one's <u>wealth</u> is subject to the same policy rule of exclusion.

Suppose a supremely well-paid business executive who exercised poor judgment in his investment of the shareholders' money took unlawful actions to avoid being found out and fired for his bad judgment – say, by creating false invoices and cooking the company's books. Evidence of his motive to avoid detection, and the loss of income that would follow detection, surely would be admissible in a criminal prosecution for those cover-up attempts.

Michael Jackson definitely was not poverty-stricken when he committed the charged offenses, and the People have no intention of attempting to prove that he was. To the contrary. He described himself to Martin Bashir as a "billionaire." With due allowance for hubris, Michael Jackson certainly was a multi-millionaire, albeit with a billionaire's spending habits. His motive in this case was to preserve both his fortune and his reputation, the integrity of which was central to his ability to continue to earn a significant income. He perceived (correctly) that his too-candid expression to Bashir of his fondness for sharing his bed with young boys posed an immediate and substantial threat to his financial well-being. As Ann Gabriel testified to the Grand Jury, the scope of the public relations disaster posed by Bashir's documentary was a "25" on a scale of 1 to 10. (RT 1485:17-23.)

¹ Martha Stewart's famous downfall was not for arguably bad judgment or even a violation of the law when she dumped her ImClone stock, but for lying about it to investigators to avoid being labeled an "insider trader" and the consequential harm to her public image.

Michael Jackson could not endure the fallout from "Living with Michael Jackson, and it sent him into a panic that drove him to commit the allegations in Count One of the indictment. Defendant believed that the only means of dealing with the tsunami of public opprobrium was to use the Arvizo family as pawns in his public relations counterattack on Bashirs entitled "Living with Michael Jackson – The Footage You were Never meant to See." This made-for-TV video was a contrivance engineered by defendant and his coconspirators to salvage what was left of defendant's public image.

It was defendant who stood to benefit financially from preventing the media from having access to the Arvizo family by isolating and controlling them. It was defendant who stood to benefit financially from obtaining the Arvizos on audio and video tape singing his praises. And it was defendant who stood to benefit financially by making this family vanish by taking the children out of school, terminating their apartment lease and sending them to Brazil. Evidence of his financial situation and the immediate threat to it occasioned by Michael Jackson's own words provides a direct link between the conspiracy and the one person in the world who stood to benefit from it – Michael Jackson.

CONCLUSION

The People have argued elsewhere that the jury cannot accurately judge the enormity of the impact the broadcast of "Living with Michael Jackson" must have had on Michael Jackson himself unless they see the entire documentary, just as it was aired in the United States in February, 2003. For the same reason, the jury cannot accurately judge defendant's assessment of the impact of that documentary on his financial well-being without evidence of his financial circumstances, both immediately before news of the documentary's content became public and thereafter.

The testimony of a financial expert is required, and is both relevant and admissible.

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I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the County aforesaid; I am over the age of eighteen years and I am not a party to the within-entitled action. My business address is: District Attorney's Office; Courthouse; 1112 Santa Barbara Street, Santa Barbara, California 93101.

On January 26, 2005, I served the within PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO

DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S FINANCES on

Defendant, by THOMAS A. MESEREAU, JR., ROBERT SANGER, and BRIAN OXMAN by

personally delivering a true copy thereof to Mr. Sanger's office in Santa Barbara, by

transmitting a facsimile copy thereof to Attorney Mesereau at his confidential Santa Maria fax

number, and by causing a true copy thereof to be mailed to Mr. Mesereau, first class postage

prepaid, at the addresses shown on the attached Service List.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Santa Barbara, California on this 26th day of January, 2005.

Gerald McC. Franklin

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