1 2 3 4 5 6 7 6 9	Thomas A. Mesereau, Jr., State Bar Number of Susan C. Yu, State Bar Number 195640 1875 Century Park East, 7th Floor Los Angeles, CA 90067 Tel.: (310) 284-3120, Fax: (310) 284-3133 SANGER & SWYSEN Robert M. Sauger, State Bar Number 058214 233 East Carrillo Street, Suite C Santa Barbara, CA 93101 Tel.: (805) 962-4887, Fax: (805) 953-7311 OXMAN & JAROSCAK Brian Oxman, State Bar Number 072172 14126 East Rosecrams Santa Fe Springs, CA 90670 Tel.: (562) 921-5058, Fax: (562) 921-2298	SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORN:A COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA JAN 2 4 2005 GARY M. BLAIR, Exocutive Officer CANALL & WARRING		
10	Attomeys for Defendant MICHAEL, JOSEPH JACKSON			
12	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
19	FOR THE COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA, COOK DIVISION REDACTED			
15	THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF) CALIFORNIA,	Case No. 1133603		
17	Plaintiffs,	OPPOSITION TO DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S MOTION IN LIMINE FOR ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY		
18	VS.) MICHAEL JOSEPH JACKSON,	ON DEFENDANT'S FINANCES AND MR. JACKSON'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO MR. JACKSON'S FINANCIAL STATUS		
20	Defendant,	DNP		
23		Honorable Rodney S. Melville Date: January 28, 2005 Time: 9:30 a.m. Dept.: 8		
24	TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT AND TO THE DISTRICT			
25	ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF SANTA BARBARA, TOM SNEDDON, AND DEPUTY			
3€	DISTRICT ATTORNEYS GERALD FRANKLIN, RON ZONEN AND GORDON			
27	OPTOCEMON AND PROPERTY OF A PROPERTY OF THE PR	CHOMON OLI DADE POUL - DI GOSVOLI DE PUIDE		
28	OPPOSITION TO DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S MOTION IN LIMINE FOR ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON DEFENDANT'S FINANCES AND MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO MR. JACKSON'S FINANCIAL STATUS 1			

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

9

10

11

12

1.7

1-1

15

16

17

19

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, on Junuary 28, 2005, at \$:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as the matter may be heard. Mr. Jackson will move, and hereby does move, for:

- (1) An order prohibiting the District Attorney from offering any evidence of and prohibiting the District Attorney and witnesses from making any reference in the presence of jurors or prospective jurous to Mr. Juckson's linancial condition, financial motive, wealth, or rising or declining financial fortunes, unless or until the District Attorney establishes one of the recognized exceptions to the prohibition to the introduction of such evidence where (a) the defendant places his wealth in issue, or (b) defendant experienced an increase in monotary resources immediately after a theft:
- (2) An order requiring the prosecution to instruct their witnesses of the court's exclusionary order on this motion; or in the alternative;
- (3) An order requiring the District Attorney, prior to making any reference, comment, or assertions concerning Mr. Jackson's lineacial condition, to approach the bench and make an offer of proof to the court so that the court, prior to any presentation of the above-referenced evidence to the jury, can make a preliminary determination of the relevancy, admissibility, and foundation thereof:
 - (4) and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
 - Mr. Jackson's Motion is based on the following grounds:
- (1) Allowing these materials into evidence would result in a violation of Mr. Jackson's federal and state constitutional rights to a fair trial, due process of law, and equal protection pursuant to the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 7, 15 and 24 of the California Constitution.
- (2) These orders are necessary to ensure Mr. Jackson will be accorded a fair trial and the trial record of this case will not be tainted with reversible error to Mr. Jackson;
 - (3) Evidence of Mr. Jackson's financial condition may not be introduced to establish a

opposition to district attorney's motion in Limine for admission of expert TESTIMONY ON DEFENDANT'S FINANCES AND MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO MR. JACKSON'S FINANCIAL STATUS

motive for a serious offense because neither his wealth, linuncial resources, nor lass of money are relevant to or probative of the commission of the crime, and any probative value is outweighed by the prejudicial effect of such evidence under Evidence Code Section 352;

(4) Evidence of a defendant's wealth may not be used to establish a motive because it utilizes a suspect criteria In an unfulr discrimination that violates Mr. Jackson's rights to equal protection and to a fair trial to prove a motive where the same thing can be said whether the defendant is rich or poor.

This motion is based on this opposition and motion, the memorandum of points and nuthorities attached hereto, the records, plendings and papers herein, and such other and further mutters as may be submitted to the Court.

Furthermore, Mr. lackson respectfully requests that the defense response to the prosecution's motion, filed on January 21, 2005, be withdrawn and that this apposition and motion in limine be filed in its place.

Mr. Jackson absolutely objects to the introduction of testimony regarding his finances. Such testimony is inadmissible under California law. Allowing such testimony would significantly prejudice Mr. Jackson without any providing any probative value. It would deprive Mr. Jackson of his federal and state constitutional rights to a fair trial, due process of law, and equal protection to the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 7, 15, and 24 of the California Constitution.

22

23

24

25

25

27

28

OPPOSITION TO DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S MOTION IN LIMINE FOR ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON DEFENDANT'S FINANCES AND MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO MR. JACKSON'S FINANCIAL STATUS

1	The prosecution's motion expressly seeks to show that			
2	2 Mr. Jackson	denies the validity of that		
3	characterization. However, even if it could be proven, the prosecution does not cite any authority			
4	for the proposition that a defendant's alleged poverty or indebtedness may be used to show motive			
5	to engage in criminal activity. In fact, the law is steadfastly to the contrary.			
5	13ated: January 24, 2005			
7	7 Respectfully submitted,			
u n	Thomas A. Mesereau, Jr.	REDDOCK & YIJ		
10	Robert M. Sanger			
11	OXMAN & JAROSCAK	a 6		
12		66.		
13		mifacts.co		
15		KSON		
16				
17				
13				
20	mjfacts.com mjfacts.com			
₩ F				
22				
23		200		
24		- 8-8-		
25	25 (
26	mjfacts.com mjfacts.com	mjracts.com		
27	27			
28		OPPOSITION TO DISTRICT A'CTORNEY'S MOTION IN LIMINE FOR ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON DEFENDANT'S FINANCES AND MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE ANY REFERENCE		

-

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

ARGUMENT

mifacts.com



EVIDENCE OF A DEFENDANT'S ALLEGED POVERTY OR INDERTEDNESS IS NOT ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW A MOTIVE TO COMMIT A CRIME

The prosecution argues that

(Motion, page 2.) The prosecution, however, does not eite any case law that supports the introduction of this type of testimony to show motive. This is because the case law squarely holds that such testimony is inadmissible.

It is a well-established rule that a defendant's poverty or indebtedness may not be admitted to prove a motive to commit crimes of financial gain. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041. 1076, stating that "a defendant's poverty generally may not be admitted to prove a motive to commit a robbery or theft..."; People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 938-938... stating that evidence of defendant's debt, admitted for the purpose of establishing a motive to commit robbery and murder, was not admissible on any proper ground.) "[Flor over a century courts have recognized the potential unfairness in admitting such evidence." (People v. Carrillo (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 94, 101.) While there are obvious reasons for the prosecution to want to use a defendant's poverty "to provide a convincing harmony to the factual melody of the crime," such evidence deprives a defendant of a fair trial and constitutes reversible error. (People v. Carrillo, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th 94, 97.)

Evidence of a defendant's poverty may be admissible for the limited purpose of refuting a

It is worth noting that the law of California has expressly prohibited the introduction of evidence such as this since, at least, 1901. (People v. Kelly (1901) 132 Cal. 430.) The prosecution failed to acknowledge these contrary cases. One can only assume that, once again, the prosecution's desire to convict a colebrity had an effect on its willingness to acknowledge the law.

OPPOSITION TO DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S MOTION IN LIMINE FOR ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON DEFENDANT'S FINANCES AND MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO MR. JACKSON'S FINANCIAL STATUS

ri N m 4

ij

claim that he did not commit the offense because he did not need the money, or to explain sadden occurrences of wealth after the occurrence of a crime (*People v. Kooniz*, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1076), the case law stands firmly against the prosecution's position that such evidence is admissible to prove a motive to commit a crime. Here, no such claim has been made by the defense.

In People v. Carillo (2004) 119 Cal. App. 4th 94, defendant was charged with robbery and aggravated assault. The evidence showed that defendant's boyfriend and father of her child grabbed a necklace and chain from a man on the street and knocked him to the ground unconscious. He then run to defendant's car and jumped in the back scat. However, the vehicle was blocked from escaping by a hystander's vehicle. The prosecution introduced extensive evidence of defendant's dire financial straits to establish a motive of why she would have assisted her boyfriend in the robbery, and the jury convicted her. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding evidence of financial motive was irradmissable, and its introduction as evidence though cross-examination or otherwise was reversible error. The court stated:

To ensure the fairness of criminal trials, the law provides that evidence of the defendant's poverty is generally inadmissible. In this case, however, the prosecution introduced a considerable amount of evidence showing Eva Carrillo was in difficult financial straits when she allegedly aided and abetted her boyfriend in a robbery. Her poverty was used to provide convincing harmony to the factual inclody of the crime. The result was a composition that convinced the jury, but contravened the law. We find this evidence deprived Carrillo of a fair trial and reverse the judgment. (People v. Carrillo, supra, 119 Cal. App. 4th 94, 97.)

The court further stated that:

It is fundamental to our conception of a fair trial that equality of treatment must be afforded to all without regard to differences in social status or economic condition. In a society which cherishes the ideal of equal justice for all and seeks to accord the equal protection of the laws to all those who are accused of crime, it would be difficult to accept any other view. (United States ex rel. Mertz v. State of New Jersey (3rd Cir. 1970) 423 F.2d 537, 541; see also 2 Wigmore, Evidence, § 392, p. 451 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979) [practical result of poverty evidence "would be to put a poor person under so much unfair suspicion and at such a relative disadvantage that for reasons of fairness (such evidence) has seldom been countenanced"].) (Id. At 102.)

The court concluded that "the jury would well have viewed her as a feekless pupper whose

23

station in life and lack of support for her two children provided her with a motive to steal." (Id. at 104.) Such evidence and the prosecutor's insinuations concerning it were found to be reversible errar. (ld.) mifacts.com

In People v. Carrillo, supra, 119 Cal. App. 4th 94 the Court admovledged that admitting such evidence would violate the Constitutional right of the defendant to a fair trial. This fair trial and due process right is secured by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 15 of the California Constitution. As also stated in Carrillo, supra, at fa.1, if defense counsel did not object, the admission of this testimony may violate the Constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and Article I Section 15 of the California Constitution. In addition, the singling out of Michael Jackson for the proffer of evidence that has been deemed inadmissible for over 100 years suggests that he is being denied the equal protection of the laws and the privileges and immunities of citizens of this country besed on his celebrity as prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I Section 7 of the California Constitution.

11.

EVEN IF THIS TYPE OF EVIDENCE WERE ADMISSIBLE THE COURT COULD NOT ALLOW IT BECAUSE THE PROSECUTION HAS NOT NAMED OR PROVIDED STATEMENTS OF THE "EXPERT FROM THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY"

As noted above, the prosecution fails to acknowledge that the law prohibits the introduction of this type of testimony. Instead, the prosecution cites statutes and case law regarding the general standards for the admissibility of expert testimony. (See Motion, pages 1-2.) Even if this type of financial testimony were admissible, which it is not, the prosecution fails to establish that it's purported expert is qualified or that his or her testimony is relevant.

The prosecution claims that an expen will testify that

(Motion, page 3.) However, the prosecution has not even provided

the name of this expert, let alone a statement of what he or she would say at trial.² It is impossible for the court to make a determination as to whether the prosecution's expert is qualified and as to whether the expert's opinion is admissible, without knowing the name of the expert and what he or she will actually say at trial.

Evidence Code Section 720(n) states that a "person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates." Stating that the expert will be an "expert from the entertainment industry" does not provide an adequate foundation for the Court to conclude that the yet to be named expert is qualified to testify to the opinion described in summary by the prosecution in the form or argument. For example, the Court has no way of determining

The prosecution has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that its experts are, in fact, qualified pursuant to Evidence Code Section 720(a).

Of course, even if the prosecution finds an expert to support its preformed opinion, this evidence is clearly inadmissible. It has been inadmissible in California for over 100 years and does not become admissible because this is a celebrity case.

acts.com mjfacts.com

The District Attorney is apparently in the process of tracking down an "expert from the entertainment industry" who will embrace the prosecution's calculation of the potential loss. One has to stand in awe of the prosecution's transparent assertion that they have an expert opinion and they just need to find an expert to give it. Would they be both so reckless and so flugrant were they not trying to convict Michael Inckson?

OPPOSITION TO DISTRICT A TTORNEY'S MOTION IN LIMINE FOR ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON DEFENDANT'S FINANCES AND MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO MR. JACKSON'S FINANCIAL STATUS

200 S

111.

CONCLUSION

regarding Mr. Jackson's finances.

Dured: January 24, 2005

COLLINS, MESEREAU, REDDOCK & YU Thomas A. Mesereau, Jr.

Susan C. Yu

SANGER & SWYSEN Robert M. Songer

OXMAN & JAROSCAK
Brian Oxman

Ву:

Robert M. Sunger

Attomeys for Defendant

MICHAEL JOSEPH JACKSON

mjfacts.com

mjfacts.com

mjfacts.co

15

1

2

.3

4

5

ő

7

Ξ

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

18

19

20

21

22 23

24

25

26 27


28

mjfacts.com

mifacts.co

OPPOSITION TO DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S MOTION IN LIMINE FOR ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON DEFENDANT'S FINANCES AND MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO MR. JACKSON'S FINANCIAL STATUS

PROOF OF SERVICE



I am over the age of 1S years and not a party to the within action. I am employed in the County of Santa Barbara. My business address is 233 East Corrillo Street, Suite C. Santa Barbara, Californio, 93101.

On January 24, 2005, I served the foregoing document entitled: REDACTED OPPOSITION TO DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S MOTION IN LIMINE FOR ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON DEFENDANT'S FINANCES AND MR. JACKSON'S MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE ANY REFERENCE TO MR. JACKSON'S FINANCIAL STATUS: UNDER SEAL on the interested parties in this action by depositing a true copy thereof as follows:

Tom Seeddon
Gerald Franklin
Ron Zonen
Gordon Auchineloss
District Attorney
1112 Santa Barbara Street
Santa Barbara, CA 93101
805-568-2398

- BY U.S. MAIL I am readily famillar with the firm's practice for collection of mail and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service. Such correspondence is deposited daily with the United States Postal Service in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid and deposited during the ordinary course of business. Service made pursuant to this paragraph, upon motion of a party, shall be presumed invalid if the postal cancellation date or postage meter date on the envelope is more than one day after the date of deposit.
- BY FACSIMILE -I caused the above-referenced document(s) to be transmitted via facsimile to the interested parties
- X STATE I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.

Executed January 24, 2005, Santa Barbara, California.

Carol Dowling